Milan Radoicic, against whom Kosovo has issued five arrest warrants and who is under sanctions from the United States and Great Britain for ties to organized crime, appeared on October 9 at a rally of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Kragujevac. He appeared there in close proximity to Danilo Vucic, the son of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic.
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Drizan Shala, a security expert, assesses that Radoicic’s public appearance next to the Serbian president’s son conveys a political message and raises questions about his relations with the government in Serbia.
According to Shala, given the responsibility Radoicic has taken for organizing the armed group that attacked in Banjska on September 24, 2023, this appearance raises concerns about the absence of a clear accountability process.
However, the expert emphasizes that his presence next to Aleksandar Vucic’s son does not in itself constitute proof of support or of an agreement with the Serbian president, but it is grounds for seeking clarifications about Radoicic’s political relations and the handling of the case by Serbian authorities.
Shala explains that Milan Radoicic’s appearance at an SNS rally, next to Danilo Vucic, the Serbian president’s son, should be read beyond a photograph or ordinary political participation. In the context of the armed attack in Banjska, this appearance raises serious questions about the relations between political structures in Serbia and individuals involved in activities that have jeopardized Kosovo’s security.
He underscores that Radoicic is not a figure without political and security history. He has taken responsibility for organizing the armed group that took part in the attack in Banjska on September 24, 2023. Therefore, his return to a public space tied to the ruling party in Serbia sends a message that cannot be ignored: individuals linked to a serious security incident in Kosovo can continue to appear in the Serbian political environment, without necessarily being seen as facing a clear and convincing accountability process.
Nevertheless, Shala draws attention to the need to distinguish between what a public appearance demonstrates and what can be proven through documents or investigations. Proximity to the president’s son is not, in itself, proof of an order or agreement with Aleksandar Vucic. But if this appearance is confirmed, it creates legitimate grounds for seeking clarifications about Radoicic’s political relations and the way Serbian authorities are handling his case.
In security policy, he says, symbolism matters, but accountability must be built on evidence, not only on political proximity or public interpretations.
Shala assesses that Serbia is continuing with a political approach characterized by pressure on Kosovo and a lack of strategic trust. According to him, the case of Milan Radoicic and his appearance at the SNS rally raise concerns about the lack of accountability and the impact this has on regional security.
He emphasizes that perceived impunity can encourage new destabilizing actions and weaken trust in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. According to him, the responsibility of Serbian institutions for the Banjska attack must be established through evidence, while Kosovo must strengthen security and coordination with international partners.
In his assessment, recent developments show that relations between Belgrade and Pristina continue to be characterized by strategic distrust, political pressure, and an unresolved conflict over Kosovo’s sovereignty.
The problem, according to Shala, lies not only in the political declarations of the Serbian leadership, but also in the gap between announced commitments to normalize relations and the way issues directly related to Kosovo’s security are handled.
The case of Milan Radoicic makes this contradiction particularly visible. He has taken responsibility for organizing the armed group involved in Banjska, where Kosovo police officer Afrim Bunjaku was killed. Yet, according to reports published on October 10, 2026, Radoicic continues to be free in Serbia, while criminal proceedings against him exist in Kosovo. His appearance at the SNS rally, next to Danilo Vucic, adds to the concern about how this issue is being handled politically in Serbia.
From a national security perspective, the main risk, according to Shala, is that perceived impunity creates a precedent for the repetition of destabilizing actions. If individuals involved in serious security incidents continue to appear in political environments without a credible accountability process, this can weaken trust in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and in international prevention mechanisms.
However, he calls for a distinction between the individual responsibility of the persons involved and the responsibility of state institutions. Serbia’s responsibility for the Banjska attack must be examined on the basis of evidence documenting the planning, financing, equipping, training, and potential institutional support of the armed group.
This distinction, Shala says, does not diminish the seriousness of the case. On the contrary, it places the issue in a framework where responsibility can be proven and pursued in a sustainable manner.
For Kosovo, the challenge is to maintain strategic vigilance, strengthen its institutional capacities, and ensure that any destabilizing action is handled with professionalism, evidence, and coordination with international partners.
Shala emphasizes that Kosovo must raise this issue with international partners, seeking legal and institutional accountability from Serbia for the Banjska attack.
According to him, if the involvement of Serbian state structures is proven, responsibility must also extend to the relevant individuals, including the political leadership, while dialogue with Serbia must be accompanied by concrete results in justice and security.
He states that Kosovo must treat this issue as part of its national security agenda and international diplomacy, seeking concrete and verifiable actions.
However, Shala underscores that Kosovo’s strongest argument is not simply the fact that Radoicic was seen next to the Serbian president’s son. The main argument is that a person who has taken responsibility for organizing the armed group involved in Banjska continues to remain in Serbia, while Kosovo’s institutions seek justice for the attack and the killing of police officer Afrim Bunjaku.
Therefore, according to him, Pristina must focus on three directions.
First, legal accountability. Kosovo must continue to seek international legal cooperation and concrete actions from Serbian authorities regarding the handling of Radoicic’s case and other suspects. Requests must be supported by indictments, administered evidence, and relevant legal cooperation instruments.
Second, political and institutional accountability. International partners must seek clarifications from Belgrade on the reasons why Radoicic continues to be free in Serbia and on the measures taken to ensure a credible accountability process. If it is proven that state structures helped organize or support the attack, responsibility must also extend to the relevant individuals and institutions.
Third, accountability within the framework of international dialogue. The Banjska issue must not be lost in the normalization agenda. Kosovo must demand that progress in political and security cooperation be accompanied by concrete results in matters of justice, accountability, and the prevention of similar incidents.
This approach, Shala concludes for “Bota sot,” is consistent with the position the Government of Kosovo has presented earlier, accusing Serbia of supporting Radoicic’s group and seeking accountability for the Banjska attack. Belgrade, on the other hand, has denied state responsibility for the group’s actions. Precisely for this reason, a full investigation and examination of evidence are essential for determining the responsibility that lies with the SNS chairman (Vucic).
